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No place like home? Explaining venue
selection of regional offices in
Brussels
Jan Beyers, Tom Donas and Bert Fraussen
ABSTRACT While subnational authorities strongly mobilize in Brussels, they do
not lobby all EU-level venues to the same extent. This article explains the varying
intensity with which regional offices interact with various EU-level policy-making
venues when seeking to influence EU policies. Theoretically, we complement an
exchange-based perspective with political-institutional and contextual factors, such
as regional political autonomy and the degree of preference alignment with key
policy-making venues. To test our hypotheses, we rely on evidence collected
through 33 face-to-face interviews with regional representations concerning their
lobbying activities in four salient policy processes. Our results highlight that while
most offices regularly interact with both national and supranational venues, the
central government representation in Brussels is always, irrespective of what is at
stake, the most important contact point. Furthermore, we also find that policy align-
ments shape venue selection, indicating some evidence of strategic manoeuvring.
KEY WORDS European Union; regional offices; territorial lobbying; venue
shopping.
INTRODUCTION
The activities of subnational authorities (SNAs) in Brussels have been studied
extensively since the mid-1980s, when the first regional offices opened
(Greenwood 2011; Marks et al. 2002; Rowe 2011; Tatham 2008). Departing
from a federalism or regionalism perspective, many authors have studied the
interaction between sub-state and national governments and focused primarily
on the vertical dimension of territorial politics (Borras 1993; Jeffrey 2000;
Marks et al. 1996; Marks et al. 2002; Moore 2008; Tatham 2008, 2010).
Other scholars have analysed the lobbying activities of SNAs at the EU level
and showed that regional representations make strategic use of multiple insti-
tutional channels when seeking to influence policy outcomes (Bomberg and
Peterson 1998; Hooghe 1995; Hooghe and Marks 1996; Rowe 2011). In this
article, we analyse why SNAs prioritize different channels in their lobbying
activities by considering organizational and contextual factors. Why do these
actors focus their attention on the Permanent Representation (PR) of their
home country, or prefer to interact with the European Commission (EC) or
# 2014 Taylor & Francis
Journal of European Public Policy, 2015
Vol. 22, No. 5, 589–608, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2014.977335
key actors in the European Parliament (EP)? This topic is of great relevance, as
the venue shopping behaviour of organized interests offers insight into the
nature of EU policy-making. It provides an indication of where actors believe
power is located and enables us to assess the importance of national and supra-
national routes in seeking policy influence (Coen and Richardson 2009; Green-
wood 2003; Mazey and Richardson 1993: i).
The study of regional offices, more specifically their involvement in EU
affairs, played a pivotal role in the debate on whether the EU-level mobilization
of regions can be understood as a multilevel power play between the central-state
level, the sub-state level and the European level (Hooghe 1995; Hooghe and
Marks 1996; Marks et al. 1996). Following neo-functional perspectives, one
would expect that supranational venues, such as the EC and EP, are prioritized
by subnational authorities. As such, regional mobilization could diminish the
pivotal position of the member states in the European political order. Intergo-
vernmental accounts, on the other hand, would emphasize the continuing
centrality of the nation-state and therefore predict that subnational actors first
and foremost interact with central governments. If, however, both national
and supranational routes are frequently taken, the observations would be
most in line with a multilevel governance perspective (Eising 2004).
Considering that SNAs engage in activities that are similar to the practices of
organized interests, we believe that insights from the interest group literature
might be useful for an analysis of the strategic behaviour of regional actors
(Donas et. al 2014). Our objective is to develop a systematic account of the
lobbying strategies regional offices employ in Brussels by focusing on specific
conditions that explain venue selection. To clarify venue selection, interest
group scholars frequently apply resource exchange theory in which policy-
makers are expected to grant access to groups in return for information and
legitimacy. In response to this, organized interests are presumed to strategically
target venues whose needs match with their resources. Notwithstanding its
potential for clarifying lobbying patterns and the access interest groups enjoy,
we argue that this exchange perspective needs to be complemented with politi-
cal-institutional factors, in casu the extent to which regions enjoy political
autonomy, and the broader context within which these actors are embedded,
such as their network embeddedness and their preference alignment with key
policy-making institutions.
This article first introduces the relevant institutional venues and presents
the overall policy context to which our analyses apply. Then we clarify how
key organizational features and contextual factors are expected to explain vari-
ation in venue selection. Our empirical analyses indicate that the lobbying
activities of regional representations are strongly focused on both national
and supranational venues. In addition, almost all regional offices develop exten-
sive contacts with the PR, irrespective of the policy issue at stake. We also find
that venue selection cannot solely be explained by mechanisms of information
exchange, as the extent of preference alignment also is a relevant explanatory
factor.
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MULTI-INSTITUTIONAL VENUE SHOPPING BY REGIONAL
REPRESENTATIONS
EU policy-making can be conceived as a multi-institutional process, in which
organized interests face various access points when seeking to influence policy
outcomes (Coen and Richardson 2009; Greenwood 2003). Moreover, all
these arenas should be monitored closely, as policy changes can be initiated
in many venues, and events taking place in one venue might shape later devel-
opments. Still, constraints in terms of time and resources will urge stakeholders
to prioritize certain institutions, which may lead to considerable differences in
venue-shopping behaviour. Previous research has demonstrated that only a
limited number of organized interests are true multilevel players who make fre-
quent use of national and supranational access points (Beyers and Kerremans
2012; Eising 2004).
In this article, we distinguish between four key venues that regional interests
are likely to frequent when seeking to influence EU policies: the Commis-
sioners; the Directorate General in charge of a specific case (DG); the EP
Rapporteur; and the PR.1 We concentrate our explanatory analyses on
contact-making with these venues, as we presume they are critical decision-
making points. A focus on the EC is obvious given its important legislative
and executive role, the latter referring to the supervision of policy implemen-
tation as well as the management of EU finances (Bouwen 2009: 20). Taking
into account the internal fragmentation of the EC, we distinguish between con-
tacts at the highest level with the Commissioner (including his/her cabinet) and
interactions with DG officials. While the former has more discretionary power,
the latter are in charge of most preparatory policy work (Bouwen 2009: 25). As a
result of its growing legislative powers during the past two decades, the EP has
become an increasingly important access point. Here, most lobbying activities
are channelled through the Committees, where the EP Rapporteur represents
one of the main gatekeepers (Lehman 2009: 52; Rasmussen 2014: 6). Yet,
also national governments and their representation in the EU remain important
access points, providing a low-cost lobbying option (Beyers and Kerremans
2012; Coen 1997).
While most EU policy-making is of a regulatory nature, we believe that there
are good reasons to focus on distributive issues when studying how regional
representations select venues. Regional offices monitor a large array of policy
domains, but generally prioritize a limited number of distributive issues in
their lobbying activities (Donas et al. 2014). These policy domains – such as
agricultural and cohesion policy – represent the bulk of the EU’s budgetary
expenditures, and their intergovernmental nature will stimulate venue shopping
(Broscheid and Coen 2007). This article focuses on four re-distributive cases
that generated the highest level of political attention from regional represen-
tations between the end of 2011 and early 2012: the Reform of the Common
Agricultural Policy Reform (CAP); Regional Policy Reform; Trans-European
Transport Networks (TEN-T); and Horizon 2020. The high density of regional
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lobbyists active on these cases makes the process of venue prioritization even
more critical, as seeking and gaining access to all relevant policy-making
venues will be costly or often not possible due to time and resource constraints.
In each of these cases, the Commission submitted legislation to revise existing
policies. As these policies involve the allocation of financial resources, the main
conflictual issues were mostly of a distributive nature. The Regional Policy
Reform concerns the overall revision of the criteria for allocating regional and
structural funding. Salient matters here involve the size of budget, the threshold
criteria in order to be eligible to structural funding, and the creation of a tran-
sition category. The CAP Reform aims to modernize the CAP and render it
both more market-oriented and sustainable. Key topics of concern for regions
were the greening of the CAP, the earmarked funding and rural development.
Third, TEN-T deals with the allocation of funds aimed to improve infrastruc-
tural transport links. Here, lobbying focused mostly on specific projects, such as
the Bothnian Corridor in Scandinavia and the Brenner Bass Tunnel from
Austria to Italy. Finally, Horizon 2020 revises the EU Framework Programme
for Research and Innovation; its goal is to strengthen the position of science in
the European economy, for instance by bridging the gap between research com-
munities and industry. One of the main issues here was whether funding should
be focused on a narrow set of regionally concentrated top universities, or more
geographically balanced across Europe.
THE DETERMINANTS OF MULTI-INSTITUTIONAL VENUE
SHOPPING
Interest group scholars often apply exchange theory and focus on functional
needs to explain the interaction between organized interests and policy-
makers (Berkhout 2013; Beyers and Kerremans 2007; Bouwen 2002; Braun
2012, Eising 2007). In short, the argument goes that policy-makers possess
limited resources and therefore require informational input from external
actors. Simultaneously, societal interests seek to interact with policy-makers
and supply policy-relevant resources, such as expertise and legitimacy, in
exchange for access and attention. This perspective emphasizes the capability
to supply information as main explanatory factor for interest group access,
which is mostly conceptualized as a function of resource endowment (often
measured in terms of staff size), as effective policy monitoring and gathering
expertise on various issues exhausts organizational resources (Klüver 2012). In
this view, more resources help to supply high-quality policy goods and therefore
enhance the likelihood of access. However, some have argued that especially the
EC is in constant need of expert information (Bouwen 2002). Therefore, the
impact of resources should be more outspoken with respect to the Commission.
More generally, the threshold for lobbying supranational venues is considered
higher compared to building contacts with national venues such as the PR
(Beyers 2002; Beyers and Kerremans 2012; Coen 1997). Therefore, we
propose the following hypothesis:
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Hypothesis 1: Regional representations with more resources are more likely to
seek information exchanges with supranational venues such as the EP Rap-
porteur or the EC.
In addition to resources, we also consider political-institutional factors. In this
regard, we should take into account the redistributive nature of the four policy
processes. Whereas in regulatory politics European policy-makers need a high
level of technical input, the intelligence required on redistributive issues is of
a more positional nature (Broscheid and Coen 2007: 354). Moreover, intergo-
vernmental bargaining between the member state governments plays a central
role on redistributive issues. Consequently, we expect that regional represen-
tations will closely co-operate with the national PR. On redistributive issues,
regions will need and seek the support from the central government, as the
latter is directly involved in the decision-making processes in the Council.
This is particularly likely if regions have budgetary and policy competencies
in multiple policy domains, which make that policy outcomes directly affect
the budget of regional governments. Moreover, regions with much self-rule
generally have established extensive relations with central governments, which
further strengthens the use of national channels (Callanan and Tatham 2014:
194). In short, we anticipate that SNAs with much self-rule will mostly seek
contact with the national PR, and these contacts will prioritize the higher
political and diplomatic level of officials that are involved in the Comité des
Représentants Permanents (COREPER), as these are most closely monitoring
EU-level intergovernmental bargaining:
Hypothesis 2: Regional representations that represent an SNA with much
self-rule are more likely to seek information exchanges with their national
PR at the COREPER level.
The activities of regional offices are not restricted to exchanges with domestic
and supranational institutional venues though. They also liaise with other
actors in order to collect information on EU policy-making. For instance,
SNAs develop regular contacts with each other through trans-regional associ-
ations, the latter referring to associations of SNAs from different member
states, yet also through informal networking with other regions (Beyers and
Donas 2014; Borras 1993; Donas and Beyers 2013; Hooghe 1995; Tatham
2008). Being tied to such networks may make them a valuable source of infor-
mation for policy-makers at both the national and EU level, as it shapes the type
of information regional offices can supply. In general, regional offices with more
formal affiliations with transregional associations are expected to show a higher
propensity to target multiple institutional venues at both the domestic
and supranational level. Yet, not only the formal embeddedness in EU-level
networks matters, but also the overall inclination to connect with regional auth-
orities located in other member states. For instance, by maintaining informal
ties with regional representations from other member states, an office gains
considerable expertise on the positions and interests of other EU regional
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authorities. Being well-informed on these matters may lead to a higher likeli-
hood of developing contacts with supranational institutions. In contrast, net-
works that are mostly focused on regions from their own member state
demonstrate a more national orientation, and thus a stronger inclination to
prioritize exchanges with the PR. Therefore:
Hypothesis 3a: Regional representations with many formal affiliations with
transregional associations are more likely to seek information exchanges
with the Rapporteur of the EP, the PR and the EC.
Hypothesis 3b: Regional representations that develop mostly informal net-
works with regions from their own member state are less likely to seek infor-
mation exchanges with the Rapporteur of the EP or the EC, and focus mostly
on the PR.
Next to considering political-institutional factors, regional representations will
to a certain degree make tactical choices regarding the venues they target. A
first element relates to the alignment between regional policy positions and
the venues addressed. In line with earlier research on interest groups, we
expect that also regional representations will mostly interact with like-minded
policy-makers (Hall and Deardorf 2006; Hojnacki 1997). Rather than make
large investments in venues that offer a limited chance of lobbying success,
regional representations will focus their attention on those venues that are some-
what receptive to their policy demands. By testing this hypothesis for three insti-
tutions we can assess the strategic nature of multi-institutional venue-shopping.
Furthermore, the pivotal importance of the EC may imply that a lack of align-
ment with its position not only decreases the propensity to target the Commis-
sion, but also increases the propensity to interact with the member state PR.
More generally, we expect that non-alignments with the position of one
venue will decrease the propensity to seek exchanges with this venue, but that
it could stimulate actors to seek access to alternative venues. This leads to two
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 4a: The higher the alignment between the position of the regional
office and an institutional venue, the higher the chance that the office seeks
information exchanges with this venue.
Hypothesis 4b: The lower the alignment between the position of the regional
office and an institutional venue, the higher the chance that other venues will
be addressed.
Finally, the policies on which lobbying takes place are also expected to shape
venue selection. One interesting aspect of the four distributive policy processes
we analyse is that they epitomize different types of issues, with unique constella-
tions of conflicts and alignments. Therefore, each policy process could be
expected to attract a distinct set of stakeholders. Some of these processes,
such as the Regional Policy Reform, attract a high number of regional represen-
tations and can be viewed as their natural habitat. Other topics are less
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exclusively concerned with territorial matters and will attract a more diverse
crowd of organized interests, including business actors and civil society (for
instance, Horizon 2020). As the latter two have industry-specific knowhow at
their disposal or can mobilize important constituencies, their input and
support can be of great value for policy-makers. Regions potentially face
strong competition from stakeholders in cases with a considerable mobilization
of functionally organized interests, particularly if the regional policy views
diverge from a prevailing policy consensus. Anticipating such high levels of
competition, regional offices may opt for a more modest role (see also Coen
[1997: 105]). This leads to our final hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5: In issue areas with many other competing stakeholders than
regional offices, the regional representations are less likely to seek information
exchanges with key policy-makers.
RESEARCH DESIGN
To collect data on venue selection we conducted face-to-face interviews focusing
on four distinct policy processes with the directors of 33 regional offices. The
identification of these policy processes relies on data collected through a tele-
phone survey with 127 regional representations (conducted in the autumn of
2011 and winter of 2012; see Donas et al. [2014]). These interviews pointed
at four cases that were most salient to regional representations late 2011–
early 2012: the Regional Policy Reform; the CAP Reform; TEN-T; and
Horizon 2020. At least 30 per cent of the responding offices demonstrated
lobbying activities in these four cases. During the spring of 2012 we conducted
in-depth expert interviews with regional offices that lobbied actively on one or
more of these cases; these interviews focused on the strategies offices deployed in
Brussels. In order to attain both a sufficient participation rate and a representa-
tive overview, we used different criteria to select these experts. We tried to
increase comparability between the cases by selecting regional representations
that during the telephone interview mentioned to be active on at least two
and preferably three of the studied policy processes. In this way, one expert
interview provided us evidence on more than one single case.2 The interview
question related to the dependent variables – the targeted venues –was formu-
lated as follows:
With respect to [NAME SPECIFIC POLICY PROCESS] did you exchange
information regularly with [NAME TARGETTED VENUE]?
We aimed to interview a diverse set of offices in terms of staff size, policy pos-
ition and self-rule. In total, 47 offices were invited for an interview and in the
end a diverse set of 33 large and small regional offices participated (a response
rate of 70 per cent). Although we interviewed somewhat more active offices, our
set of interviewees represent SNAs with low and high levels of self-rule, as well as
J. Beyers et al.: Explaining venue selection of regional offices in Brussels 595
SNAs that adopted different policy positions and that originate from a diverse
set of member states (see online Appendix [supplemental material]). More
specifically, of the 33 representations that were interviewed, 14 worked on
CAP, 20 on Horizon 2020, 32 on the Regional Policy Reform and 21 on
TEN-T. As we are primarily interested in the political activities related to
these specific processes, the units of analysis are the 87 lobbying campaigns.
For the independent variables, we rely on data from secondary sources, the
33 expert interviews and information collected through the telephone interviews
with 127 regional representations.
The data on the offices’ staff size were collected during this larger survey. To
measure self-rule – autonomous authority exercised by the SNA executive over
the constituency living in the region – we use the index developed by Hooghe
et al. (2010), which involves a combination of four four-point items measuring
institutional depth, policy scope, fiscal autonomy and representation.
The evidence on the policy alignments was collected through the 33 face-to-
face interviews during which respondents were asked detailed questions con-
cerning their own policy position and the positions of other actors. In order
to measure the distance of a regional representation’s position to the EP, the
EC and the central government, the respondents were first asked to describe
(through an open question) how they perceived the (various) lines of conflict
related to each case; next they had to identify which of these conflicts were
most important to their regional representation and the central government.
The next questions focused on this particular conflict line and respondents
were asked to position all the stakeholders involved on an 11-point scale
ranging from –5 to +5. Subsequently, the respondents had to indicate the pos-
ition of their region, the central government, the EC and the EP on the same
continuum. Alignments are measured on the basis of the absolute difference
or the distance between the position of the region and the position of the EP,
the EC or the central government. This distance scale index ranges from 0
(perfect alignment) to 7.5 (maximum de-alignment) with a median distance
of 2. Yet, in 20 per cent of the cases respondents reported difficulties or were
reluctant in positioning themselves vis-à-vis some institution, especially if the
institution had not taken a clear position, for instance because it was less directly
involved in a specific issue. This was particularly the case with regard to the EP’s
(lack of a) position vis-à-vis the implementation of some TENT-T projects. In
such instances, expert-based interviews limit the use of fine-grained scales and a
forced use of a fine-grained scale may lower overall data-quality. Hence, our evi-
dence allows us to differentiate cases with considerable alignment (low distance)
from cases with non- (no clear position) or de-alignment (a large distance). We
classified cases with a distance lower or equal to the median distance as being
aligned; other cases were coded as dis-aligned.
In the telephone survey, we also asked to name other Brussels offices with
which they informally exchanged information during the past six month; the
total number of ties a regional office initiates with other offices measures its
informal network. To assess the extent to which an office prioritizes exchanges
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with offices from its own member state (or rather with regions from other
member states), we use Krackhardt and Stern’s E-I index (1988: 127–8; see
Beyers and Donas 2014) which indicates the propensity of regions to establish
exchanges outside the group – in this case their member state – to which they
belong. The index ranges from –1 (all exchanges within member state) to +1
(all exchanges with offices from other member states). For the data on the
formal networks, the websites of the trans-regional associations were coded in
order to obtain information on their members (Donas and Beyers 2013). For
each regional representation, we mapped the number of memberships in a trans-
regional association, as a proxy for the amount of formal affiliations. We add the
(logged) count of ties a regional office initiated with other offices as a control
variable; one can expect that more active offices are keener to address various
institutional venues.
DATA ANALYSES
Before presenting our multivariate analyses, we describe the venue selection for
the four lobby campaigns and the clustered structure of our data. Figure 1 visu-
alizes the percentage of offices that reported contacts with each distinct venue on
the four policy processes (only venues that are of a key concern in this this paper
are included). In about 90 per cent of the campaigns, the regional representa-
tives had contact with someone within the EP, the national PR and the EC,
which indicates that all these institutions represent pertinent lobbying venues.
Contact with a Commissioner appears relatively less common, but still more
than 50 per cent of the regional representations established contacts at this
level. However, these institutions should not be considered monoliths; they
consist of different components (Hooghe and Marks 1996; see also Tatham
2008). If we look more closely at some critical decision-making venues, such
as the EP Rapporteur or the competent DG, we observe that there is consider-
able variation in the extent to which regional representations interact with these
actors.
It is clear that regarding the EC attention is targeted at the DGs, and that
Commissioners, who are politically appointed and supervise the civil servants
of the DGs, are less frequently approached. Besides targeting the Commissioner
in charge, a regional representative can also approach another Commissioner in
order to indirectly influence a specific issue. Yet, regional representations
develop very little contacts with the Commissioners from their own member
state (15 per cent with their national Commissioner compared to 63 per cent
with the competent Commissioners). Likewise, concerning DG officials
regional offices can focus on the lead DG in charge, or other DGs that might
have a small stake in a specific case. Contacts with DGs situated in other
policy fields, however, are fairly rare, as only 15 per cent of our respondents
reported such contacts. While nationality does not play a key role for the Com-
missioners and the DGs, it plays some role for the EP. Here, regions establish
considerable contacts with MEPS from their member state (84 per cent). In
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contrast, contacts with the EP Rapporteur and Members of the European Par-
liament (MEPs) from other countries are also less frequent (56 per cent versus
64 per cent), an observation that confirms the national orientation of regional
offices (see below). Given the key role the EP Rapporteur plays in the legislative
process and the importance of their position for lobbyists, the analysis below
focuses on the EP Rapporteur (Rasmussen 2012: 243).
Finally, when we look at the PR, almost all regional representations (95 per
cent) had contact with their national PR; only four offices did not report con-
tacts with the PR in specific lobbying campaigns. Yet, there are considerable
differences regarding the level that is approached. One can roughly distinguish
two levels in the PR. The lower level involves the national officials who meet in
Council working groups and assist and prepare the meetings of COREPER.
The former are usually policy experts seconded from the national and, for
some countries, the regional bureaucracy, while the latter are high-level diplo-
mats who are responsible for preparing ministerial level Council meetings,
negotiate in COREPER and consequently play a key role in the policy-
making process. We can clearly identify two equally sized sets of regional
offices. On the one hand, we have offices that focus their energy on the
working group level only (46 per cent), while there is another group that in
addition to contacts with working groups also addresses higher-level
COREPER officials (49 per cent). The analyses below concentrate on explain-
ing why some offices address these higher levels in the PR.
Before we turn to a multivariate analysis, we point at the clustered nature of
the data. In particular the nesting of our interviewees – heads of regional offices
– in member states is something to be careful about, especially because much of
the above cited research demonstrated that member state embeddedness con-
siderably affects a region’s lobbying practices (Callanan and Tatham 2014;
Donas and Beyers 2013). To begin with, we tried to minimize dependency
Figure 1 Venues regional representations approach in four lobby campaigns
(percentage of contact-making, n¼87)
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problems through the way we arranged the interviews. A risk with interviews is
that respondents are tempted to repeat their responses when confronted with
similar questions for different cases, which causes dependencies due to an inter-
view effect. During the interviews we deliberately focused the interviewees to
differentiate and compare the different processes in which their office was
involved. Of course, this does not entirely rule out dependent observations,
but we believe it minimized dependencies due to interview effects and made
that observed clustering will mostly have substantive reasons. Therefore, we
assessed how the extent of clustering differs for the various dependent variables.
To check this – e.g., whether homogeneity within sets of regions, country or
cases reduces the overall variability in our sample and results in a lower effective
sample – we calculated the intra-class correlation (ICC), the design effect (DE)
and the effective sample size (ESS) for the four dependent variables (DG, EP,
EC and PR) and three levels (region, country and policy process).
The pattern of clustering shown in Table 2 provides us with some relevant
insights. First, the clustering of campaigns in 33 interviews (regional offices)
shows little relation with the dependent variables, except for the PR where we
observe a strong effect of clustering. For the PR, the ICC is 0.47, which
means that almost half of the total variation is accounted for variation
between the 33 interviews only. It is interesting to see that clustering occurs pri-
marily with regard to a variable that is strongly member-state related, i.e.,
Table 2 Assessing the extent of clustering and independence (intra-class
correlations ICC, effect design ED and effective sample size ESS)
EP
European




















































Notes: DE ¼ 1 + ICC(m–1); ESS ¼ m∗k/DE; numbers are in bold where ESS drops
below 70.
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seeking contact with the PR. Second, with the exception of targeting EC DGs,
the clustering in the 14 member states has a considerable effect on the ESS.
Again, the effect is most outspoken for the PR, although it is also considerable
for the EP. Note that the descriptive analysis above also demonstrated that while
nationality plays an important role for the EP, this is not the case for the EC.
Finally, as expected, there is, considerable clustering for the policy issues, in par-
ticular for the EP and the Commissioners.
Our multivariate models are estimated with generalized estimating equations
(GEE) and the quasi-likelihood information criterion (QIC) for evaluating
model fit (Pan 2001). For the PR we estimated a model comparing those
who approach high-level COPEPER officials with those who establish their con-
tacts mostly at the level of the working groups. We control for the issue cluster-
ing with three dummies; as reference category we take the Regional Policy
Reform, because this process involves most regional mobilization and can be
seen as the main focus of much regional lobbying. As our sense is that that
the clustering of 33 interviews is largely equivalent to the member state cluster-
ing, we use a logistic regression with corrected standard errors whereby we
cluster by member state. Table 3 presents the results from our analyses.
Most lobbying activity of regional representations focused on the Regional
Policy Reform. Yet, although the parameters are always negative, it is only in
the cases of Horizon 2020 and TEN-T (but only for contacting the Commis-
sioner) that these coefficients are significant. It is worthwhile noting that
Horizon 2020 differs considerably from the other three cases in terms of align-
ment and the overall competition surrounding this case (Hypothesis 5). First of
all, this process is characterized by the highest policy distance between regions
and all three venues.3 Second, the overall distance between the member state
central governments and the EC is very low compared to other policy pro-
cesses.4 It appears that a relatively close alignment of the positions of central
governments and the EC, in combination with a considerable distance
between regions and the EC, depresses attempts to interact with all suprana-
tional venues (the EC, DGs and the EP Rapporteur), possibly because the
gains that can be made are rather limited. In other words, when the policy
dis-alignment of a region with their central government and the EC is large,
regional representations might decide not to invest too many political resources.
For the PR it is only with regard to Horizon 2020 that we observe a significant
association between the level at which contacts are established (COREPER level
vis-à-vis only working group level) and specific policy processes. In the case of
Horizon 2020 most contacts take place at a lower level within the PR. Impor-
tantly, the frequency of contact with the PR (albeit sometimes at a lower level) is
always high. This is a relevant observation, as it shows that the PR always is a
central partner for regional offices, regardless of what is at stake, or the particular
policy positions of the regional government.
As hypothesized, the self-rule of a region, a proxy for its ability and its need to
supply regional/national encompassing political information has a considerable
impact on the level of contact within the PR. Regions with considerable self-rule
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are much more likely to establish contacts at the COREPER level, while those
without much self-rule stick to the working group level. This is also exemplified
when we compare two federal countries (Germany, Austria) and two regiona-
lized countries (Spain and the UK) with the other countries. For offices repre-
senting regions located in these four countries, 84 per cent of their contacts are
situated at the COREPER level, while this is only 26 per cent for the other
countries. On the other hand, regions with much self-rule are not significantly
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Notes: Corrected standard errors clustered by member state, † ¼ ,0.1, ∗ ¼ ,0.05,
∗∗ ¼ ,0.01, ∗∗∗ ¼ ,0.001.
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more likely to approach supranational venues. This shows that, although regions
with much self-rule are eager to establish their own regional office (Donas and
Beyers 2013), such regions are not necessarily better tied to EU-level policy-
making venues. However, their strong Brussels-based presence clearly corre-
sponds with a considerable propensity to develop connections at the diplomatic
levels within the PR. This shows that in concrete lobby campaigns on salient
cases, offices representing highly autonomous regions function as relevant
Brussels-based liaisons between the regional government and the central state
government.
Interestingly, political capabilities, measured as overall staff size, have no sig-
nificant effect. Generally, once mobilized in Brussels (by establishing a regional
office), other factors than resources appear more important in explaining venue
shopping behaviour. We have significant bivariate correlations in the case of the
EP Rapporteur and the PR (r ¼ 0.21 and 0.35 respectively), but these bivariate
relations evaporate when we control for other variables such as networks, align-
ment or self-rule. Regional offices with more affiliations with transregional
associations and those who initiate more informal ties are more likely to estab-
lish contacts with the EP Rapporteur, but in contrast to our expectation this
variable generates no significant effect for the Commission.5 It is also relevant
to briefly note the results for the PR. We have significant bivariate correlations
for some network variables and the chance that an office established ties with the
COREPER level (r ¼ –0.35 for affiliations, r ¼ 0.42 for total ties, and a non-
significant correlation of r ¼ 0.14 for the E-I index). However, these
correlations diminish considerably in value when we control for self-rule (see
above), and only the total amount of established ties with other regional
offices has a positive impact on seeking contact with the higher political-admin-
istrative levels in the PR. As we show elsewhere (Beyers and Donas 2014), most
of these ties are with offices representing a region from the same member state.
Therefore, these results confirm the dominant inward-looking propensity of
most regional offices. Furthermore, the inclination to establish exchange
relations with regions from other member states (measured with the E-I
index) makes regional offices significantly more eager to network with the
EC – both the Commissioner and the DG in charge – and confirms the rel-
evance of an extensive embeddedness in outward-looking EU-level informal
networks for interactions with the Commission.
Finally, the results show that policy alignments clearly affect regional lobby-
ing strategies. Generally, we have considerable support for hypothesis H4a. A
proximity with the ECs policy position stimulates contact making with supra-
national venues, in particular the DG (Exp(b) ¼ 3.09) and the Commissioner
(Exp(b) ¼ 9.68). The fact that we do not observe any impact for the PR again
confirms that alignment with the central government has no impact on who is
contacted within the PR; basically, regional offices will always talk with the PR.6
We have some support for H4b. If there is a considerable dis-alignment with the
EP, the regional lobbyist will increase its efforts to approach the Commissioner
(Exp(–b) ¼ 9.39). The more a region’s policy position is aligned with the
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central government, the less likely it is to interact with the DG in charge; or, a
dis-alignment with the central government increases the likelihood to target the
DG (Exp(–b) ¼ 2.97), which fits into the image of the Commission as a poten-
tial ally for regional actors. Although these effects remain rather modest, they are
indicative of the tactical nature of regional lobbying.
CONCLUSION
Regional offices are increasingly mobilized at the EU level, and understanding
how they operate provides insight into the nature of the European political
order, namely the extent to which EU policy-making reflects a governmental
arena in which member states still occupy a dominant position, or rather is
consistent with functionalist or multilevel governance accounts (Marks et al.
1996; Moravcsik 1998). Theoretically, we argued that multi-institutional
venue shopping cannot solely be explained by dynamics of resource exchange,
but also needs to account for political-institutional and contextual factors,
such as political alignments, specific characteristics of the policy issues
concerned and the networks in which regional offices are involved.
The results indicate that regional offices frequently approach civil servants
of the Commission, the EP Rapporteur and the PR, while contacts with the
Commissioner and her/his cabinet are relatively more scarce. Importantly,
there are substantial differences between these venues in terms of whom they
attract. First, we observe an impact of the nature of the policy case on the tar-
geting of the EP Rapporteur, the Commissioner and the DG, as contact with
these venues was most intensive on the Regional Policy Reform, but signifi-
cantly less frequent for Horizon 2020 (where central government positions
were closely aligned with the EC, while the EC position diverged substantially
from the regions). Second, an alignment with the EC increases the chance to
lobby the EC Commissioner and DG in charge, while a dis-alignment vis-à-
vis the EP and the central government makes regional offices more likely to
seek interaction with respectively the DG and the Commissioner. Third,
although these findings fit into the traditional image of the Commission as a
potential ally of regional interests (Hooghe 1995; Hooghe and Marks 1996),
the exchanges with supranational venues do not lower the efforts to address
national institutions. We have no evidence that the mobilization of regions
implies the bypassing of the central state, even not for regions with a high
level of self-rule. On the contrary, irrespective of what is at stake, the national
PR is always a relevant interlocutor, and especially more autonomous regions
are eager to touch base with the higher levels in the PR. These findings are in
line with other research that concludes that the regionalization of European
states has not hollowed out member state representation and that sub-state auth-
orities collaborate intensively with central state authorities, rather than bypass-
ing them (Tatham 2008; 2010; 2012; see also Moore 2008).
Finally, one important caveat seems in place. By focusing mainly on key
contact points, we were able to demonstrate the strategic nature of multi-
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institutional venue shopping in the EU. However, as our analyses only apply to
these contact points, care is needed when trying to generalize these results to the
entire institution (for instance, the EP), as other access points (such as domestic
MEPs, but also shadow-rapporteurs) might also be relevant venues for some
regional offices. Moreover, the results could be different for regulatory or less
salient cases where lobbying communities are possibly less dense. In addition,
for future research it might be interesting to explore in more detail how regional
offices seek political allies in the Brussels crowded policy environment. Finally,
our analyses preclude us from making strong inferences on the precise policy
influence of regional lobbyists. Future studies therefore might want to consider
how various tactical decisions, such as venue selection and multi-institutional
venue shopping, may generate effective policy influence.
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NOTES
1 The Committee of the Regions (CoR) is not taken into account as it has only an advi-
sory function.
2 More precisely, one interviewee talked with us on one process, 11 interviewees
informed us about two processes, 20 interviewees about three processes and one inter-
viewee about four processes.
3 The median distance between regions and the EC, the EP and the national govern-
ments is respectively 4, 4 and 3.5. These numbers are considerably lower for CAP
(3.5, 1.5 and 0.5), Cohesion (1.5, 1.5 and 3.5) and TEN-T (1, 1 and 3).
4 The median distance between central governments and the EC was 0 for Horizon
2020 (close to complete alignment), while the median was 3.5 or higher for CAP,
Cohesion and TEN-T.
5 We lack a robust explanation for this because our knowledge about the precise role
these transregional associations play in the EU is limited. One of the reasons could
be that these associations are only loosely involved in the co-ordination of the indi-
vidual lobby efforts of regional offices.
6 One might argue that regions and central governments are always aligned and that
this explains their strong ties. However, our evidence shows that this is not the
case. For instance, the median distance between regions and their central government
is 3, while it is 1.5 for the Commission and 2 for the EP (see also Table 1).
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